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Abstract
The Nordic countries have dual income taxation, with a proportional tax on capital income
and a progressive tax on labour income. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) argue that this asym-
metric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure e¢ciency grounds. The
progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human capital
investment, thereby o¤setting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to
discriminate in favour of such investments. They use a simple overlapping generations model
in a small open economy. The consumer faces a trade-o¤ between investments in …nancial and
human capital, and education serves only as a means to shift consumption between periods.
The present paper expands this model by including the intrinsic value of education as a mo-
tivation behind getting education. I …nd that the argument in favour of dual income taxation
is strengthened. A comprehensive proportional income tax works as a tax subsidy on human
capital investments, and it reduces the price of education as a consumption good. This may
explain the puzzle why so many choose to get higher education in the Nordic countries, where
the wage return to education is modest. By introducing a progressive labour income tax, the
total return to education is reduced. Hence the e¢ciency distortion in the capital market may
be partly neutralised.
Keywords: Dual income tax; Optimal income taxation; Human capital investment; Intrinsic
value of education.
JEL classi…cation: H21; H24.
1 Introduction
In Norway there is an ongoing debate whether or not it is recommendable to have ‡at labour
income taxation. Status quo is dual income taxation, with a proportional tax on capital income
¤A previous version of this paper has been presented under the title ”Optimal income taxation with endogenous
human capital formation”.
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and a progressive tax on labour income. This should be seen in contrast to a comprehensive income
tax, where income is taxed at the same rate independent of source. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997)
argue that this asymmetric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure e¢ciency
grounds. The progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human
capital investment, thereby o¤setting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to
discriminate in favour of such investments. They use a simple overlapping generation model of a
small open economy. The consumer faces a trade-o¤ between investments in …nancial and human
capital. He seeks to maximise his lifetime consumption, and education is only a means to shift
consumption between periods. The cost of getting education is foregone labour income.
If the individual faces a choice between investing in real or human capital, the tax system
creates another distortion. Depreciation of real capital is tax deductible, whereas the depreciation
of the human capital to zero at death is not. Nerlove et al. (1993) investigate this e¤ect on the
accumulation of real contra human capital in society. They …nd, in contrast to Nielsen and Sørensen,
that comprehensive income taxation will discriminate against human capital investments.
Often the individual faces more costs than the time spent on education. Most of these costs, as
e.g. tuition and books, are not reduced by a labour income tax. Hence the total costs of education
will be reduced less by an income tax than the return to education. As shown by Heckman (1976),
this will have a negative e¤ect on the accumulation of human capital.
The possibility to substitute leisure for labour introduces a new distortion caused by the income
taxation. Labour income taxation causes decrease in the price of leisure. The consumer will wish
to have more leisure and to work less, given that the substitution e¤ect dominates the income
e¤ect, and this labour reduction also reduces the total wage return to education. Altogether the
individual prefers less education.
In all of these models, the only reason for the individual to get education, is higher expected
wages. The Nordic countries, and especially Norway, have small wage di¤erentials. The OECD-
countries have over the last decades experienced a rapid growth in the demand for educated labour,
mostly due to increased international trade and technological changes. At the same time, there has
been an increase in the supply of educated labour. But in most of these countries, the supply e¤ect
has been dominated by the demand e¤ect, and the relative wage of educated labour has increased
(Førre.and Salvanes (1999), Kahn (1998)). Gottschalk (1997) …nds that in the U.S. the return to a
college degree compared to having only high school was 31% in 1973, while it in 1993 had risen to
53%. This did not happen in Norway. According to Hægeland et al. (1999) the return to education
in Norway has been more or less stable during the years between 1980 and 1990. Since the wage
return to education is so small, there has to be other and possibly more important motives than
higher expected wages behind the individual’s decision to invest in human capital.
Additional motivation for getting an education is the possibility to enjoy the life as a student,
to learn new things, and to pursue own interests. Education increases the chances of getting an
interesting job. Flexibility between jobs increases through education, and chances are that when
unemployed, the individual can easier …nd a new job. Bishop (1994) found that for most of the
OECD-area the larger part of the unemployed in the 1980s had no higher education. The social
2
status connected to having higher education is a factor not insigni…cant for the educational deci-
sions. We cannot rule out that expectations and norms in the society have an in‡uence on whether
or not the young person chooses to get education. In fact, Hægeland et al. (1999) …nd that the
parental educational level has a positive in‡uence on the length of the education their children
choose to get. They also …nd that there is a tendency that the children of wealthy parents get an
education of a longer duration.
All of these non-wage related motives behind the educational choice, I summarise as the intrinsic
value of education. The present paper expands the model of Nielsen and Sørensen by including
the intrinsic value of education as a motivation behind getting education. The objectives are to
investigate the consequences for the optimal tax pro…le, and to see if progressive labour income
taxation still is defendable on e¢ciency grounds. Education is no longer just an investment object
and a means for shifting consumption between periods; it bears a direct utility for the consumer.
The intrinsic value of education makes education a kind of consumption good; the individual
increases his utility directly through getting education. I study optimal taxes in two cases; …rst in
the pure consumption model of Nielsen and Sørensen, and then in the expanded model with intrinsic
value of education. Section 2 presents the general framework and analyses consumer behaviour in
the two models. In section 3 the optimal tax analysis is carried out for both cases, and the results
are compared. Section 4 summarises the results.
2 The Models
2.1 General Assumptions behind the Models
A representative consumer lives for two periods, 1 and 2. Let T1and T2 be the length of the periods,
which need not be equal. The individual devotes a …xed number of hours, Li , to leisure in each
period. In the second period, the remaining time is spent working, whereas he may spend some of
the time getting an education in the …rst period. The time budget constraints are
Period 1 : T1 = H1 + E + L1;
Period 2 : T2 = H2 + L2;
with Hi denoting the time he spends working in each period i: E is the time spent on education.
Individuals leave no bequests and there are no government transfers. Thus, labour is the only
source of income. Let w be the real wage, i.e. the basic wage for all workers. tl 1 is the labour
income tax for unskilled labour. First period consumption is given by
C1 = w(1 ¡ tl)(T1 ¡ E ¡ L1) ¡ S; (1)
1 This is the lowest tax rate in a progressive tax system, and it is what Nielsen and Sørensen call t1 . The subscripts
1 and 2 denominate the two periods of time, and to avoid confusion, we let the subscripts l and h denominate the
low and high tax rates.
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with S being savings made in the …rst period. r is the real interest rate paid on assets held from
period 1 to period 2. Savings may be positive or negative, and we assume that there are no liquidity
constraints.
Education is another kind of savings. If an individual gets education in the …rst period, his wage
in the second period increases by g(E). g(E) is the function representing the return to education,
assumed to be increasing and concave in E:
g¶> 0; g¶< 0:
I.e. the more time he spends on education, the higher will his wage in the next period be. We also
assume
g(E) > 1; g(0) = 1;
implying that the individual always gains from getting education. This rules out the possibility that
an unskilled worker may get better paid than a skilled worker. The cost of education is foregone
labour income in the …rst period. The consumer does not face any direct costs of education. To
be able to analyse the e¤ects of progressive taxation, we introduce a proportional tax th on the
additional wage [g(E) ¡ 1] that the consumer receives in the second period, if he spent some time
getting education in the …rst period. We have a progressive labour income tax if tl < th, and a
proportional income tax if tl = th. Capital income, r , faces the proportional, exogenously given
tax rate ¿ .
We use period one consumption as numeraire, and set its price to be one. Period 2 consumption
is
C2 = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿ )r]S + (1 ¡ tl)w(T2 ¡ L2) + (1 ¡ th)w[g(E) ¡ 1](T2 ¡ L2): (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives the lifetime budget constraint:
C1 + pC2 = wl[T1 ¡ E ¡ L1 + p(T2 ¡ L2)] + pwh[g(E) ¡ 1](T2 ¡ L2) (3)
= wl(H1 + pH2) + pwh[g(E) ¡ 1]H2:
By introducing a new notation, we can simplify the representation of consumer behaviour both in
he the case with and without taxes. De…ne
wl = (1 ¡ tl)w; (4)
which is the marginal after tax real wage for unskilled labour (the net basic wage). The marginal
after tax real wage for skilled labour is de…ned as
wh = (1 ¡ th)w: (5)
Then the net wage return to education is equal to wh[g(E) ¡ 1]H2.
4
The relative price of period 2 consumption measured in units of consumption in period 1 is de…ned
as
p ´ 1
1 + (1 ¡ ¿ )r : (6)
Note that for ¿ > 0, we have
p >
1
1 + r
;
implying that the capital income tax makes future consumption more expensive. I.e. the consumer
must give up more consumption in period 1 to achieve a given level of consumption in period 2.
This is if he uses the …nancial market to shift consumption between periods.
I will now investigate how the consumer’s preferences matter in his reaction to di¤erent tax
levels. To do this, I specify his utility function in two di¤erent ways; in the …rst he only gets
utility from consumption. This is the speci…cation used by Nielsen and Sørensen2 . In the second,
education has an intrinsic value and is therefore included in the utility function.
2.2 Model i) - The pure consumption model.
Let the utility function of a representative consumer be
U = U (C1; C2); U1 > 0; U2 > 0:
I.e. utility depends on consumption only. U1 and U2 denote the marginal utility of consumption in
period 1 and period 2, respectively. The consumer’s maximisation problem is
max
C1;C2;E
U (C1;C2) s.t. the budget constraint (3).
The …rst order conditions for an interior optimum are:
U1 ¡ ¸ = 0; (7)
U2 ¡ p¸ = 0; (8)
¡wl + pwhg0(E)H2 = 0: (9)
¸ is the marginal utility of money, assumed strictly positive. (7) and (8) state the usual …rst order
conditions; that the marginal utilities of consumption equal the marginal costs. Rearranging (9)
gives
wl = pwhg
0(E)H2: (10)
2 My conditions may di¤er slightly from the ones of Nielsen and Sørensen. The reason for this is that they
normalised time endowment to 1 in each period, whereas I have chosen not to.
5
The marginal cost of getting education equals the discounted marginal gain. The marginal gain is
the present value of the additional income he gets in period 2 by choosing to get one more unit of
education in period 1.
From (9) we get the optimal investment condition:
(1 ¡ ¿)r = (1 ¡ th)
(1 ¡ tl)
g0(E)H2 ¡ 1: (11)
Condition (11) states that in optimum the net marginal rate of return on …nancial capital invest-
ments (the left hand side of(11)) is equal to the net marginal rate of return on human capital
investments (the right hand side of (11)). Private returns to the two types of investments di¤er
from their social returns. The social return to investments in …nancial capital is the real interest
rate, r, whereas the private return to these investments is the after tax interest rate, (1 ¡ ¿)r .
Investments in human capital give a social return of g0(E)H2¡ 1, but the private return is reduced
by the labour income taxes. If there are no taxes, equation (11) reduces to
r = g0(E)H2 ¡ 1 (12)
In this case, the consumer invests in …nancial and human capital until the social returns on the
margin are equal. Here no distortions exist, and so private and social returns are identical. The
income taxes create distortions since the social return on the investment di¤ers from the return
that the consumer faces when he makes his investment decisions.
Combined with the budget constraint, the …rst order conditions give us the demand functions:
C1 = C1(wl; wh; p); C2 = C2(wl; wh; p); E = E(wl; wh; p):
The indirect utility function is found by substituting these demand functions into the utility func-
tion:
V (wl; wh; p) ´ U (C1(wl; wh; p); C2(wl; wh;p)):
Using the envelope theorem, we …nd the …rst order derivatives of this function:
@V
±wl
= ¸(H1 + pH2); (13)
@V
±wh
= ¸p[g(E) ¡ 1]H2:
These expressions will be useful later on.
2.3 Model ii) - Intrinsic value of education.
Higher future wages is not the only reason why the consumer chooses to get an education. E.g. the
fact that education enables him to get an interesting and challenging job is important. I summarise
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the other factors behind the educational decision as the intrinsic value of education. The way I
model this, is to include education in the individual’s utility function.
Let the utility function be
U = U(C1; C2; E); U1 > 0; U2 > 0; UE > 0:
UE is the marginal utility of education, and it represents the intrinsic value of education. Education
now has a kind of consumption value, and we will investigate how this in‡uences the consumer’s
investment decisions.
The maximisation problem of a representative individual now becomes
max
C1;C2;E
U (C1; C2; E) s.t. the budget constraint (3).
The …rst order conditions for an interior optimum are:
U1 ¡ ¸ = 0; (14)
U2 ¡ p¸ = 0; (15)
UE ¡ [¸wl ¡ pwhg0(E)H 2] = 0: (16)
Manipulating (16) gives the condition for optimal investment behaviour:
(1 ¡ ¿)r = 1
1 ¡ UE(1¡tl)w¸

(1 ¡ th)
(1 ¡ tl)
g0(E)H 2
¸
¡ 1: (17)
The individual invests in …nancial and human capital until the marginal return is equal in the two
investment alternatives. Compared with the optimal investment condition in the pure consumption
model (equation (11)), we have an additional fraction on the right hand side.
UE
(1 ¡ tl)w¸
is the consumer’s marginal consumption value of education, measured in net labour income. This
fraction is clearly positive. It is also smaller than one, which can be shown by investigating (16).
The additional consumption value of education induces the consumer to invest in human capital
at a lower wage return than in the pure consumption model. If the consumer is to reduce his
educational level, he must be compensated for the direct utility reduction. This means that the
interest rate now must be higher to make the consumer give up one unit of human capital and
invest in one extra unit of …nancial capital instead. The consequences for the optimal tax pro…le
are important, and I will treat these thoroughly in section 3.2.
Combined with the budget constraint, the …rst order conditions give us the demand functions:
C1 = C1(wl; wh; p); C2 = C2(wl; wh; p); E = E(wl; wh; p):
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The indirect utility function is found by substituting these demand functions into the utility func-
tion:
V (wl; wh; p) ´ U(C1(wl; wh; p); C2(wl ;wh; p); E(wl; wh; p)):
Using the envelope theorem, we …nd the …rst order derivatives of the indirect utility function;
@V
±wl
= ¸(H1 + pH2); (18)
@V
±wh
= ¸p[g(E) ¡ 1]H2:
These are needed for the optimal tax analysis.
2.4 The production sector.
The domestic sector produces one good, which is a perfect substitute for the foreign good. The
price of the foreign good is exogenously given and normalised to 1. Hence the price of the domestic
good also has to be 1. The industry has a standard neoclassical production function of the form
Z = F (K; N );
where Z is the amount produced, K is the total amount of capital in the industry, and N is total
e¤ective labour input. The production function is linear and homogenous of degree one, so that
Z = Nf (k); with k =
K
N
:
In steady-state, when work e¤ort is constant over time, the total e¤ective labour input is given by
N = (T1 ¡ E ¡ L1) + g(E)(T2 ¡ L2):
At each point in time there are two generations living in the economy. (T1 ¡ E ¡ L1) is the work
e¤ort of the young generation, who also invests in education during the period. The old generation
o¤ers g(E)(T2 ¡ L2) e¤ective units of labour.
The industry demands of capital and labour are given by
f0(k) = r; f(k) ¡ rk = w;
with k being the capital intensity in the industry (capital per unit e¤ective labour input), and w
the real wage per unit of e¤ective labour. From this we see that domestic capital intensity and the
real wage are given by the international interest rate, implying that domestic pre tax factor prices
remain una¤ected by changes in the domestic tax rates. Therefore saving and labour supply will
only need one period to fully adapt to new tax rates.
8
2.5 The public sector.
The public sector o¤ers goods and services, and it has a …xed level of expenditure. Public expen-
diture is …nanced through an exogenously given tax on …nancial income (¿), a labour income tax
(t), and by issuing debts (D). The government wishes to carry through a tax reform to introduce
Pareto-e¢cient labour income tax rates. Tax rates are chosen so as to maximise the welfare of the
current young generation and all future generations, without reducing the welfare of the current
old generation. To give all generations the same utility gain from the reform, the government must
adjust its burden of debt and keep this new level of debt constant through all future periods. In
each period there are two generations, from which the government receives taxes. With the super-
script ”0” denoting pre reform variables, the government budget constraint for the reform period
becomes
t0l wH2 + t
0
hw[g(E
0
) ¡ 1]H 2 + ¿rS0 + tlw(T1 ¡ E ¡ L1) + D = G; (19)
where p = p0, D0 = 0, and S0 = (1 ¡ t0l )wH
0
1 ¡ C 01 :
In the next period, all living individuals have fully adapted to the new tax rates. The government
may therefore, without problems, tax everybody according to the new Pareto-optimal tax rates.
In this period, the governmental budget constraint is
tlw(T1 ¡ E ¡ L1) + tlwH2 + thw[g(E) ¡ 1]H 2 + ¿rS = G + rD; (20)
where S = (1 ¡ tl)w(T1 ¡ E ¡ L1)¡ C1 is the savings of the old generation in the previous period.
By substituting for D from (19) into (20) and manipulating, we …nd the public budget con-
straint:
(1 + r)(w ¡ wl)H1 + (wh ¡ wl)H2 + (w ¡ wh)g(E)H2 + ¿r(wlH1 ¡ C1) ¡ (1 + r)G + rR = 0;
(21)
where R = t0l wH 2 + t
0
hw[g(E
0
) ¡ 1]H2 + ¿rS0 is a constant.
3 Optimal tax analysis.
Taxes are chosen so as to maximise the welfare of the inhabitants at the least e¢ciency loss.
Analytically, we maximise the consumer’s indirect utility function with respect to the net wages
wl and wh subject to the public budget constraint.
3.1 Optimal taxes in model i) - The pure consumption model.
The governmental maximisation problem now is
max
wl;wh
V (wl ;wh; p) s.t. the public budget constraint (21)
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From the corresponding Lagrange-function, we …nd the …rst order conditions:
@V
@wl
+ ¹
(
¡H 2 ¡ (1 + r)H1 + (1 + r)(w ¡ wl) @H1@E @E@wl
+(w ¡ wh)H2g0(E) @ E@wl + ¿ rwl
@ H1
@E
@E
@wl
+ ¿ rH1 ¡ ¿r @ C1@wl
)
= 0; (22)
@V
@wh
+ ¹
(
H2 + (1 + r)(w ¡ wl) @H1@ E @E@wh ¡ g(E)H2
+(w ¡ wh)H2g0(E) @E@wh + ¿rwl
@H1
@E
@E
@wh
¡ ¿r @C1
@ wh
)
= 0: (23)
Tedious manipulations, using equations (13), (22), and (23), give the condition for optimal tax
policy: 
(H1 + pH2)
@E
@wh
¡ p(g(E) ¡ 1)H2
@E
@wl
¸
¢

1 ¡ tl
1 ¡ th
(1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r) ¡ (1 + r)
¸
= 0 (24)
An increase in the net wage for skilled labour increases the return to education, inducing the
individual to invest more in human capital. An increase in the net wage for unskilled labour
increases the cost of investing in human capital, as measured by foregone labour income. This
causes the individual to reduce his investment in human capital.
@E
@wh
> 0;
@E
@wl
< 0; g(E) > 1:
The …rst bracket of (24) is accordingly positive. For equation (24) to hold, the second bracket on
the left hand side must be zero.
With no tax on capital income, ¿ = 0, the Pareto-optimal labour income tax rates are given by
tl = th, i.e. a proportional labour income tax. A proportional labour income tax does not in‡uence
the investment decision of the consumer. It is thus a neutral tax on human capital investments.
Combined with zero taxation of …nancial income, the social return on both kinds of investments
equal the private return. The tax does not create any distortions in the capital market.
If there is a positive tax on …nancial income, ¿ > 0, the optimal income tax rates are given
by tl < th, so that we have a progressive labour income tax. The progressive labour income tax
reduces the wage return to human capital investments, and thereby reduces some of the distortions
that would arise with a proportional labour income tax. If both the labour income tax and the tax
on capital income are proportional, tl = th, the optimal investment condition (11) reduces to
(1 ¡ ¿)r = g0(E)H2 ¡ 1: (25)
Here we have no actual taxation of the returns to human capital investments. This is because the
return to the investment faces the same tax rate as the cost, measured in foregone labour income
in the …rst period3 . Return to …nancial investments on the other hand, faces a positive tax rate ¿ .
This causes distortions in the investment market in favour of human capital. We see from the above
3 Sandmo (1979) shows the neutrality of a cash ‡ow tax.
10
equation that the consumer will invest in human capital at a lower rate of return than in the case
with no taxes. Since education has a diminishing rate of return, this means that he invests more
in human capital than he would have done if there were no taxes. This overinvestment in human
capital is counteracted by a progressive labour income tax, reducing the return to education.
The next step is to investigate the optimal tax rates in the situation where education has an
intrinsic value.
3.2 Optimal taxes in model ii) - with intrinsic value of education.
The government’s maximisation problem is
max
wl;wh
V (wl ;wh; p) s.t. the public budget constraint (21)
The …rst order conditions in this case are the same as conditions (22) and (23) of model i). Inserting
equation (18) into the …rst order conditions and manipulating, we …nd the condition for optimal
tax rates when education has an intrinsic value;µ
1 + p¿ r
@C1
@Y
¶
UE
w¸
+
µ
wl ¡
UE
¸
¶
1
wh
¡ p(1 + r) = 0: (26)
In the case of no tax on capital income, ¿ = 0, equation (26) reduces to:
UE
w¸
+
µ
wl ¡
UE
¸
¶
1
wh
¡ 1 = 0:
I.e.4
th > tl:
Contrary to the corresponding results in model i), we …nd that even with no taxation of capital
income, it is optimal with progressive labour income taxation. The intuition behind this can be
understood by considering the consumer’s optimal investment condition, equation (17):
(1 ¡ ¿)r = 1
1 ¡ UE
(1¡tl)w¸

1 ¡ th
1 ¡ tl
g0(E)H2
¸
¡ 1:
Due to the additional direct utility return to education, a proportional labour income tax is no
longer neutral; it discriminates between the two investment alternatives in favour of human capital
4
UE
w¸
+
µ
wl ¡ UE
¸
¶
1
wh
¡ 1 = 0 =) 1¡ tl
1 ¡ th
¡ th
1 ¡ th
UE
w¸
= 1 =)
(1¡ tl)¡ (1¡ th) = thUE
w¸
> 0 =) th > tl
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investments. To see this clearly, let ¿ = 0, and th = tl > 0 in equation (17), and compare this
with the situation with no taxes at all, ¿ = th = tl = 0. In the …rst case the consumer’s marginal
consumption value of education is larger than in the second:
UE
(1 ¡ tl)w¸
>
UE
w¸
:
I.e.
1
1 ¡ UE(1¡tl)w¸
>
1
1 ¡ UEw¸
:
In both cases, the right hand side of (17) must equal the real interest rate r: Hence the marginal
return to education has to vary, in order for the equality to hold:
[g0(E)]tl>0 < [g
0(E)]tl=0 :
I.e.
[E]tl>0 > [E]tl=0 :
The tax on labour income creates price distortions in favour of human capital investments, and
the consumer chooses to get more education than in the case with no taxes.
The reason for the distortion in favour of investments in human capital is that only the wage
return to education is reduced through the income tax; the direct utility return remains unchanged.
This implies that the total tax rate on return from human capital investments decreases, compared
with the pure consumption model. But the alternative cost of investing in human capital, given
by the net basic wage, is the same in the two cases. Put di¤erently, a proportional labour income
tax works as a tax subsidy on human capital investments, still creating distortions in the capital
market. The tax makes education cheaper. Return to …nancial investments must be higher in the
case with labour income tax in order to shift investments between …nancial and human capital. A
progressive labour income tax reduces the wage return to education, and hence the total return.
The consumer chooses to invest in …nancial capital at a lower interest rate than in the case with
proportional labour income tax. The progressive labour income tax reduces the distortions in the
capital market, and we get a solution closer to the optimum.
With positive tax on capital income, ¿ > 0, it is analytically more complicated to characterise
the optimal tax rates on labour income. From the optimal tax condition (26), we getµ
p¿ r
@C1
@Y
¡ th
1 ¡ th
¶
UE
w¸
+
1 ¡ tl
1 ¡ th
=
1 + r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r : (27)
We know that
1 + r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r > 1;
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implying that the left hand side of (27) is positive and greater than one. Consumption is assumed
to be a normal good in both periods. The marginal propensity to consume is therefore between 0
and 1;
0 <
@C1
@Y
< 1:
A reasonable value of the marginal propensity to consume is 0,5, which will be used throughout
the analysis.
The capital income tax lies within the interval
0 6 ¿ 6 1:
We may assume that it is no larger than 0,5, since, in an open economy, capital ‡ows out of the
country if tax rates are too high. In the following analysis, we let ¿ = 0; 28, which is the tax rate
on capital income in Norway.
By investigating the expression pr, we …nd that
pr =
r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r < 1 if r <
1
¿
= 3; 57;
a condition quite likely to be ful…lled. Estimating the real interest rate is di¢cult, since we have not
speci…ed the length of the periods. It is a good approximation to say that the annual real interest
rate is 5%, summing up to 165% over a period of twenty years. (Here we include the compound
interest.) Assuming that the individual only has a time span of 20 years when choosing how much
to invest in human capital, the above condition is met. In the following r = 1; 65, i.e. a real interest
rate of 165%:
With these values, the …rst term in the brackets of equation (27) becomes
p¿ r
@C1
@Y
=
¿r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r
@C1
@Y
=
1;65 ¢ 0; 28
1 + (1 ¡ 0; 28) ¢ 1; 65 ¢ 0; 5 = 0; 106:
If the expression in the brackets of (27) is to be positive, the surtax th must not exceed a critical
value. This treshold value of th is:
th
1 ¡ th
< 0;106 =) th < 0; 096:
I.e. th must not exceed 9,6%, which is substansially below the current marginal rate of income tax.
Therefore the expression in brackets of (27) is negative.
We have stated that the marginal consumption value of education measured in net labour
income is positive,
UE
w¸
> 0:
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As long as th > 0; 096, the …rst term on the left hand side of (27) is negative. To make the equality
in (27) hold, the following must be true:
1 ¡ tl
1 ¡ th
=
1 + r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿ )r +
µ
th
1 ¡ th
¡ p¿r @C1
@Y
¶
UE
w¸
>
1 + r
1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r > 1: (28)
I.e.
tl < th:
As expected, it is optimal with progressive labour income taxation when there is a tax on capital
income. The analysis is purely qualitative, so we cannot conclude about the optimal degree of
progressivity. Intuitively, labour income taxation should be more progressive when capital income
is taxed, than when it is not.
(th ¡ tl)¿=0 < (th ¡ tl)¿>0:
This follows from the fact that the distortions in the investment market increases when tax on
capital income is introduced, which favours human capital investments. From (28) we see that the
surtax must be substantially higher than the basic labour income tax in order to ful…l the equation.
These results can be shown to hold for other values of the real interest rate and of the marginal
propensity to consume.
4 Concluding remarks.
OECD proposes in its 1997country report for Norway that the educational pro…le in Norway
corresponds badly with the estimated future demand for labour. They suggest that there will be a
future excess of people with theoretical knowledge, and a lack of people with vocational skills.Try
(2000) shows that over the last years, there has been a clear development in Norway towards
a concentration on …elds of study with a modest wage return. This indicates that the intrinsic
value is an important factor in the educational choice. Also, over the last decades, we have seen a
development towards a less progressive labour income tax. A comprehensive proportional income
tax (tl = th = ¿) could possibly increase this trend of choosing …elds of study with a modest wage
return. The proportional labour income tax reduces the price of education as a consumption good,
and could induce the individual to consume more than in the case with no taxes. This provides an
e¢ciency argument in favour of progressive labour income taxation.
In a world with tax on capital income, a progressive tax on labour income is the second best
solution. It minimises the e¢ciency distortions in the capital market. When education has an
intrinsic value, it can be seen as a good for which the consumer is willing to pay. The e¢ciency
argument in favour of a progressive labour income tax is then strengthened. The consumer chooses
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to invest in human capital at a lower rate of return than if education was considered only as an
investment. A comprehensive proportional income tax makes the consumption of education even
cheaper, which from an e¢ciency point of view leads to further overinvestment in human capital.
The need for a progressive labour income tax to correct for these distortions increases accordingly.
I have used the simplest model possible, and it is worth noting that I cannot say anything
about the levels of these tax rates beyond their progressivity. Neither does this analysis consider
distributional issues, or possible positive external e¤ects of education.
By generalising the wage return function to education to make the return depend on total
amount of human capital in the society, we could study the external e¤ects of education. An
individual’s return to education depends not only on his own choices, but also on the educational
decisions of the other individuals living in the society.
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